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Relational Autonomy, Maternalism, and the Nocebo Effect 
Abstract (209 words) 
In their target article, Fortunato et al. suggest that the nocebo effect, in which an 
individual experiences an adverse effect of medical treatment due to negative expectations, 
occasions a dilemma between autonomy and nonmaleficence. They work to resolve the 
dilemma by arguing that in some cases, nonmaleficence outweighs autonomy. In this 
commentary, we suggest that the concept of autonomy presumed to underlie informed 
consent practices is at the root of this predicament – not a pro tanto conflict between 
autonomy and nonmaleficence. We propose that if the concept of relational autonomy is 
utilized instead, this conflict dissolves. To concretize this conceptual point, we describe how 
the types of informed consent practices endorsed by the authors (in which disclosure is 
calibrated to the individual patient and follow-up is utilized) are actually widely practiced in 
Japan. Elucidation of these practices requires a wider lens on informed consent practices that 
includes support staff such as nurses and medical social workers as well as family members. 
These practices, best understood as maternalistic (rather than paternalistic), are ethically 
justifiable from a relational autonomy perspective. As we argue, there are good reasons to 
approach the nocebo effect from this perspective; doing so both dissolves the autonomy/best-
interests dilemma and grounds concrete suggestions for reducing the nocebo effect. 
Commentary Article (1,492 words) 
Fortunato et al.’s target article extends both the ethical analysis and the clinical 
practice of nondisclosure by focusing on nocebo effects. Instances of this phenomenon occur 
when a patient experiences an adverse effect arising from his or her own negative 
expectations of a medical treatment, rather than from the treatment itself. The nocebo effect is 
inherently connected with the debate over the permissibility of nondisclosure, since it is the 
disclosure of possible side effects that is causally related to the increase in the probability of 
such effects occurring. According to Fortunato et al., practitioners thus face the “nocebo 
dilemma”, since the possibility of disclosure-induced effects occasions an ethical dilemma 
between the principles of nonmaleficence and autonomy. The authors work to resolve this 
dilemma by arguing that nonmaleficence should be prioritized over autonomy in cases of 
nocebogenic risk, and by supplementing this argument with a clinical proposal intended to 
reduce the attendant loss to autonomy in a follow-up stage.  
We question this way of setting up the discussion: framing the issue in terms of a 
dilemma is not, we contend, representative of what is at stake, and distracts from the nuanced 
dynamics at work in these kinds of cases. Our aim is to show that adopting a relational 
understanding of the concept of autonomy can, at least in cases where certain conditions are 
met, dissolve this putative dilemma between autonomy and nonmaleficence. This has 
implications for the structure of the ethical debate over nocebo effects, which we sketch using 
the framework of maternalism (Specker Sullivan 2016). We do not wish to undervalue the 
contribution made by Fortunato et al.’s article; their proposals for the practical dimensions of 
this issue are largely in line with the account we develop. Our objective is to ensure that 
practical proposals of this sort are grounded in a fuller appreciation of the relevant ethical 
considerations; the key to gaining access to this is, we suggest, to step beyond the constraints 
placed on this discussion by the standard understanding in bioethics of the autonomy/best-
interests dilemma.    
Our conceptual critique is directed, first and foremost, at the conception of autonomy 
assumed by Fortunato et al.’s argument. Beyond descriptors such as “laissez-faire autonomy” 
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and “autonomy qua informed consent”, there is little explanation of what the authors intend 
by the term “autonomy”. It is clear that a patient’s or subject’s autonomy and her best 
interests are thought to conflict (Fortunato et al. 8-9), and that the idea of paternalism best 
captures the features of this conflict (ibid. 16-17). Nonetheless, there are also indications that 
the authors are suspicious of standard descriptions of autonomy, as when they question 
whether patients’ “purely self-determined choices” really do exist (ibid. 3). This suggests that 
they do not accept “laissez-faire autonomy” – by which we assume they mean the idea that 
giving patients information and then leaving them to make their own independent decisions is 
what is required for respecting their autonomy – as the prima facie or pro tanto duty it is 
often thought to be. This introduces a conceptual difficulty, as the authors understand the 
nocebo effect in terms of a dilemma between pro tanto moral duties, and yet they seem to 
challenge the moral significance of one of these obligations (when understood as laissez-faire 
autonomy). It is no surprise, then, that their argument develops in favour of prioritizing 
patients’ best interests.  
We propose that, based on Fortunato et al.’s own comments, the concept most 
appropriate to their understanding of autonomy is relational, not informational. Relational 
autonomy is the idea that our autonomy competencies – to recognize, enact, and reflect on 
our values, desires, beliefs, and commitments – are formed, developed, and revised through 
interactions with others (Meyers 1989; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). As so conceived, an 
individual’s autonomy is not at odds with her best interests, but is of a piece with it. We 
believe that the authors default to autonomy qua informed consent instead of relational 
autonomy, and as such reject this view of the relationship between autonomy and best 
interests (Fortunato et al. 8-9), due to their use of the framework of paternalism to capture the 
ethically salient features of the nocebo effect. Paternalism is intimately intertwined with 
laissez-faire autonomy: it describes situations in which an individual’s autonomy is violated 
in favour of her best interests. Consequently, the principle of antipaternalism, which has long 
held an orthodox position in bioethical debate, is thought to ensure that individuals have the 
opportunity to make their own decisions independent of external influences and with full 
knowledge of the relevant facts.  
 Yet this is not exactly the problem of the nocebo effect. The worry is not about the 
benefits and risks of a physical act (e.g., surgery), but rather that the information required for 
this full informed consent practice can itself be the cause of harm. The nocebo effect suggests 
that some information may harm patients through their expectations of certain side effects. 
For these patients, negative expectations have physical ramifications. These physical 
ramifications are not without consequence, and they also are not independent of autonomy: 
for many people, to suffer such (potentially unnecessary) side effects is to experience the 
diminishment of one’s autonomy competencies. In their final analysis, Fortunato et al. imply 
that the cause of the side effects is either a unique feature of the patient, or a specific quality 
of the information (ibid. 15-17). In other words, they treat information as a metaphysically 
independent entity that is conveyed from one party (the physician) to the other (the patient), 
with harm resulting either from the patient’s psychology or from the quality of the 
information. Yet what is more likely (and as their nod towards Wells and Kaptchuk’s (2012) 
“contextualized informed consent” proposal reinforces) is that adverse side effects result 
from the situation as a whole – this includes how, when, and to whom the possibility of side 
effects is disclosed. Relational autonomy acknowledges that harm can result from this 
physician disclosing information in this way to this patient.  
The problem, then, is not that there is a pro tanto dilemma between the principles of 
autonomy and nonmaleficence, or even that they are in conflict, but that clinicians do not 
have a reliable method for determining how and when to disclose information to patients such 
that harm will not result. As it happens, this is exactly the practical problem faced by 
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clinicians in Japan, where diagnoses such as cancer can be withheld from patients if it is 
thought that such diagnoses will harm them and adversely affect future treatment decisions 
(i.e., restrict their autonomy). Japanese clinicians do not conceptualize this as a principled 
dilemma and their practice does not face an impasse; instead, they rely on family and trained 
support staff, such as nurses, medical social workers, and clinical psychologists to apprise 
them of the patient’s traits and attitudes, and to help them determine the likelihood that full 
disclosure will be harmful (Specker Sullivan 2017). This practice approaches informed 
consent as multi-staged, recognizing that the preservation and development of autonomy 
competencies for any given situation is an ongoing process, and as involving multiple parties. 
The temporary withholding of a diagnosis is conceptualized not as a choice in favour of best 
interests over autonomy (a paternalistic decision), but as a decision that preserves the 
patient’s capacity for exercising autonomy competencies in the future by not causing harm in 
the present. As Fortunato et al. themselves note, the practical constraint with this kind of 
contextualized approach is that physicians may have neither the training nor the time to 
individualize their approach to each patient in this way; this is the reason for involving family 
and support staff.  
The concept of maternalism captures the ethically salient features of these Japanese 
informed consent practices, as well as of the nocebo effect. Maternalism can be defined as 
acting for the benefit of another person and taking that person’s autonomous will into 
account, yet without an explicit expression of consent or assent by the person on whose 
behalf the decision is made (Specker Sullivan 2016). While classic antipaternalist arguments 
view this type of action as paternalistic (arguing that without an explicit expression there 
cannot be certain knowledge of the acted-upon person’s autonomous will), maternalism 
proposes that certain relationships, characterized by trust and understanding, provide the 
epistemic grounding for such interpersonal knowledge, and that actions based in this 
knowledge need not violate autonomy.  
We propose that, for situations such as the nocebo effect, maternalism is a better 
analytical tool than the autonomy/best-interests dilemma relied on in this target article. 
Nondisclosure of harmful information is not paternalistic if it supports the patient’s goals and 
values (and thus her autonomy competencies). While this maternalistic decision does rely on 
close knowledge of the patient, this is the type of information gleaned through trusting 
relationships formed with family and support staff. Recognizing and encouraging the role of 
support staff in disclosure and informed consent may be one way to respond to practical 
concerns about the implementation of contextualized, or maternalistic, communication 
practices. 
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